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BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS.
HOMESTEAD.  The debtors owned 85 acres of rural land
located within the boundaries of a town but not served by at
least three of the municipal utilities listed in the rural exemption
law, Tex. Prop. Code § 41.002(c). The court held that, under the
Texas exemption statute, the property was rural because it was
not served by at least three of the listed municipal utility services.
Because the property was rural under Tex. Prop. Code §
41.002(c), the property was eligible for the rural homestead
exemption. In re Bouchie, 324 F.3d 780 (5th Cir. 2003).
CHAPTER 12
ELIGIBILITY. The debtors were dairy farmers but all of the
cows and much of the equipment had been repossessed or sold
before the filing for bankruptcy. The debtors’ current income
came from off-farm employment and the debtors stated that they
intended to restart the dairy farm as soon as funding was
obtained, either by savings or loans. The plan was to be funded
from leasing a portion of the farm and from off-farm income. A
creditor argued that the debtors were ineligible for Chapter 12
because they were no longer farming. The court held that the
time for determining whether the debtors were farming was the
time of the petition filing and whether, at that time, the debtors
had an intent to continue farming. The court noted that the
creditor had not presented any evidence to contradict the debtors’
assertion that they intended to continue the dairy as soon as they
could obtain financing. Because the debtors were farming when
the bankruptcy petition was filed and intended to continue
farming, the debtors were held to be eligible for Chapter 12.   In
re Nelson, 291 B.R. 861 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).
PLAN. A secured creditor objected to two aspects of the
debtors’ Chapter 12 plan, (1) the plan failed to specifically state
that the creditor would retain its lien on dairy farm assets and
(2) the plan provides for $1,000 per month to come from leasing
a portion of the farm but, at the time of the plan confirmation
hearing, no lease had been negotiated. The court held that the
debtors would be allowed to amend their plan to include the
lien and would be allowed time to negotiate a lease. The evidence
showed that the debtors had sold collateral without paying the
proceeds to the creditor, had not used wind damage insurance
proceeds to repair collateral which was damaged, and had
allowed a neighbor to repossess collateral which secured the
creditor’s liens. The creditor argued that the debtors’ plan should
not be confirmed because these actions showed a lack of good
faith. The debtors argued that these actions were taken to provide
operating funds for the dairy. The court noted that the debtors’
actions were less than exemplary but held that the evidence did
not show that the debtors had attempted to defraud the creditor
and were motivated by an honest attempt to keep the dairy
operating while trying to solve their financial troubles. When
the two conditions stated above had been met, the court held
that it would allow the plan to be confirmed. In re Nelson, 291
B.R. 861 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).
SECURED CLAIMS. The debtors were grain farmers who
had granted a creditor a security interest in seed and farm
inventory. The debtors used seed and inventory owned before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition to plant crops after the filing
of the petition. The creditor asserted its lien covered the post-
petition crops because the crops were grown from seed and farm
inventory possessed before the petition. The court agreed and
held the post-petition crops were covered by the pre-petition
lien. In re Thacker, 291 B.R. 831 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2003).
FEDERAL TAX
DISCHARGE. The debtor had been convicted of fraudulent
business practices through an illegal telemarketing company.
The debtor and corporations did not file income tax returns or
pay income tax during years of fraudulent operations, although
the debtor requested extensions of the filing date. After the debtor
was imprisoned, the debtor filed the missing income tax returns,
overstating taxable income in order to avoid any further criminal
charges. More than three years later, the debtor filed for Chapter
7 and sought to have the unpaid taxes discharged. The court
held that the taxes were nondischargeable because (1) the debtor
knew the tax returns were due and taxes owed and (2) the debtor
failed to file the returns or make payments. In re Passavant,
291 B.R. 879 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiff
cooperative entered into five hedge-to-arrive contracts with the
defendant producer. Although the defendant was prevented from
making initial deliveries because of a lack of storage space, the
HTA contracts were rolled over to a later period. When delivery
was finally made, the defendant was short on the contract amount
of grain and repudiated the remainder of the contract. The
defendant argued that the HTA contracts were illegal off-
exchange futures contracts. The court upheld a jury verdict for
the plaintiff because the parties always intended actual delivery
of the grain, as evidenced by the defendant’s delivery of most
of the contract grain. Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 324 F.3d
627 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’g, 149 F. Supp. 2d 709 (N.D. Iowa
2001).
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
KARNAL BUNT. The APHIS has issued proposed regulations
which amend the Karnal bunt regulation to include (1) clarifying
the method for determining Karnal bunt infestation and the
circumstances under which a field or area would be classified
as a regulated area, as well as adding provisions and criteria for
the release of fields or areas from regulation; (2) modifying the
restrictions that apply to the planting of wheat, durum wheat,
and triticale seed originating in regulated areas; and (3)
modifying cleaning and disinfection requirements for certain
equipment and storage facilities involved in the harvesting,
planting, or storage of Karnal bunt-positive host crops or seeds,
as well as providing for the disposal of chemically treated, spore-
positive seed. 68 Fed. Reg. 40534 (July 8, 2003).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ALTERNATE VALUATION DATE. The decedent’s estate
retained an attorney to prepare the estate tax return which was
timely filed. Within one year of the due date for the return, the
attorney discovered that the alternate valuation date election
should have been made and sought an extension to make the
election. The extension was granted. Ltr. Rul. 200327043,
March 31, 2003.
ANNUITY. The taxpayer owned an annuity contract issued
by a company. The taxpayer was the obligee under the contract.
The taxpayer contracted with an insurance company to issue a
new annuity contract. The taxpayer assigned 60 percent of the
cash surrender value of the first annuity contract to the insurance
company to be used to purchase the second annuity contract. At
no time during the transaction did the taxpayer have access to
the cash surrender value of the first annuity contract used to
purchase the second annuity contract. No consideration other
than the cash surrender value of the first annuity contract that
was transferred was paid in this transaction. The terms of the
first annuity contract were unchanged by this transaction, and
the first annuity contract was not treated as newly issued. The
IRS ruled that (1) the surrender of the first annuity contract was
a tax-free exchange, (2) the basis of the second annuity contract
was 60 percent of the basis of the first annuity contract, and (3)
the taxpayer’s investment in the second annuity contract was 60
percent of the original investment in the first annuity contract
and the taxpayer’s investment in the first annuity contract was
40 percent of the original investment. Rev. Rul. 2003-76, I.R.B.
2003-33.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The IRS has adopted as fi-
nal regulations which amend the existing regulations under I.R.C.
§§ 170, 2055, and 2522 governing charitable guaranteed annu-
ity interests and unitrust interests to eliminate the requirement
that the charitable interest can not be preceded in point of time
by a noncharitable interest that is in the form of a guaranteed
annuity or unitrust interest. The regulations conform to the hold-
ing in Estate of Boeshore v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 523 (1982), acq. in
result, 1987-2 C.B. 1, which held that a charitable deduction
was allowed for unitrust and remainder interests passing to a
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. The plaintiff was a
hunter who was injured while hunting on land which had been
used to dump diatomaceous earth and fruit pomace (fruit
processing waste). The plaintiff fell through an earthen covering
and was burned because the wastes had started burning from
spontaneous combustion. The plaintiff sued the fruit processor
who had hired an independent contractor, the owner of the farm,
to dispose of the wastes. The evidence indicated that the
defendant had been notified that the farmer had been improperly
disposing of the wastes by dumping them together in a pit on
the farm. The evidence also indicated that the pit had started
burning and had produced smoke and odors which were the
source of complaints by neighbors to the defendant. The
dumping was also not licensed. The defendant sought dismissal
of the case, arguing that it was not liable for the injury because
the improper disposal was the act of an independent contractor.
The court held that the plaintiff had pled and shown sufficient
facts that, if proved at trial, would support enforcing liability
against the defendant for the acts of the independent contractor.
The court also held that the same facts, if proved at trial, would
support a violation of the Hazardous Waste Management Act,
Wash. Code Ch. 70.1.05, which would extend liability to the
defendant for the acts of the independent contractor. Hickle v.
Whitney Farms, Inc., 64 P.3d 1244 (Wash. 2003), aff’g, 29
P.3d 50 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BEEF CHECK-OFF. The plaintiffs were livestock producers
subject to the assessment of one dollar per head of cattle to be
used by the USDA and the Cattlemen’s Beef Board for
promotion of the beef industry, as provided by the Beef
Promotion and Research Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. The
plaintiffs challenged the law as an unconstitutional violation of
the First Amendment. The plaintiffs objected to the assessment
because it paid for advertising for beef products, such as steak,
which is not the product which the plaintiffs sold, live cattle.
The court held that, under United States Department of
Agriculture v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, aff ’g, 197 F.3d
221 (6th Cir. 2000), the assessment was a violation of the
plaintiffs’ first amendment rights of free speech and association.
The court made its temporary injunction permanent and
prospective from July 15, 2002. The court also refused to issue
a stay pending further appeal to the Eighth Circuit or appeal to
the Supreme Court, citing the continuing harm to the producers
who are under stress from economic and environmental
conditions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. See Harl, “Future of
Commodity Check-Offs,” 12 Agric. L. Dig. 113 (2001).
Livestock Marketing Ass’n v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769/2832 (8th
Cir. July 8, 2003), aff’g, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. S.D. 2002).
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(Pub. L. No. 98-369) eliminated this rule but provided, instead,
that a taxpayer’s amount at risk is not increased by amounts
borrowed from a person related to a person (other than the
taxpayer) who has a disqualifying interest in the activity. The
proposed regulations change Prop. Treas. Reg. §  1.465-20 to
reflect the amendment made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
The proposed regulations also modify the previous proposed
regulations to reflect Section 465(b)(3)(B)(ii), which provides
that, for purposes of determining a corporation’s amount at risk,
an interest as a shareholder is not a disqualifying interest. Thus,
amounts borrowed by a corporation from its shareholders may
increase the corporation’s amount at risk.  Finally, the proposed
regulations also modify the previous proposed regulations to
reflect Section 465(b)(6)(A), which provides that “qualified
nonrecourse financing,” if borrowed for use in an activity of
holding real property and secured by real property used in the
activity, is not subject to the limitations of Section 465(b)(3). In
addition, the proposed regulations expand the exception to include
financing that, if it were nonrecourse, would be financing
described in Section 465(b)(6)(B). 68 Fed. Reg. 40583 (July 8,
2003).
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION. The taxpayer owned two
corporations and had one corporation execute a sale of a business
plan and intellectual property in exchange for a promissory note
from the other corporation. Several years later, the taxpayer
claimed a bad debt deduction based on the unpaid promissory
note. The court noted that the transaction required close scrutiny
because the taxpayer controlled both corporations. The court held
that no deduction was allowed because (1) the taxpayer did not
file any tax return showing the sale of the alleged property; (2)
the taxpayer did not provide any evidence of the business plan or
intellectual property involved; (3) there was no evidence that the
note was transferred to the taxpayer personally from the second
corporation; (4) the promissory note had no terms of interest or
payment, no collateral was required, and the first corporation never
made any payments on the note; and (5) the taxpayer provided
no evidence of any attempt to collect payment.  Sundby v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-204.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayers established a
charitable unitrust under which the taxpayers retained the power
to change the trust charitable beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the
contributions to the trust were not eligible for the charitable gift
deduction because the gifts were incomplete. Ltr. Rul.
200328030, April 4, 2003.
CLERGY. The taxpayers were church ministers and received
compensation from their churches for their services. The court
ruled that the income received by the taxpayers was not exempt
from tax, although the church may be exempt from tax on its
income. In re Pomeroy, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,568
(D. Nev. 2003).
COOPERATIVES. The taxpayer was an electrical cooperative
which received payments to retire previously allocated patronage
capital in 1995, 1996 and 1997 in another cooperative. The
taxpayer reported the payments as income when received and
allocated the payments between its members and nonmembers
by using the percentages of member/nonmember power
charity where, although the initial interests in the trusts were
noncharitable, all the nonremainder interests in the trust were
unitrust interests. 68 Fed. Reg. 40130 (July 7, 2003), amend-
ing Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-6, 20.2055-2, 25.2522(c)-3.
GIFTS. The taxpayer invested in timberland and formed a
limited liability company to own and manage the properties.
The taxpayer contributed the timberland, cash and securities
to the LLC in exchange for voting and nonvoting stock. The
LLC agreement provided that LLC members could not transfer,
assign, convey, sell or encumber their interests without prior
consent of the LLC manager, the taxpayer. The taxpayer made
a series of annual gifts of voting and nonvoting interests in the
LLC to the taxpayer’s children and claimed the annual
exclusion for each of the gifts. The court held that the gifts
were not eligible for the annual exclusion because the gifts
were not present interests in property since the donees could
not transfer, assign, convey, sell or encumber their interests.
The court also noted that the LLC was projected to receive
only net losses for many years during the growth of new trees
and that the LLC agreement made distributions of any income
discretionary with the taxpayer as manager, thus making any
economic benefit to the gifted interests only a future interest
with uncertain benefit. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. See also Harl & McEowen, “Gifts of Future
Interests,” 13 Agric. L. Dig. 105 (2002). Hackl v. Comm’r,
2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,465 (7th Cir. 2003), aff’g,
118 T.C. 279 (2002).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD. The IRS has issued a revenue
procedure amending the exclusive procedure under I.R.C. §
442  and Treas. Reg. § 1.442-1(b) for individuals filing federal
income tax returns on a fiscal year basis to obtain automatic
approval to change their annual accounting period to a calendar
year. Rev. Proc. 2003-62, I.R.B. 2003-32.
“AT RISK” LOSS LIMITATION. Under I.R.C. §
465(b)(3), amounts borrowed for use in an activity will not
increase the borrower’s amount at risk in the activity if the
lender has an interest other than that of a creditor in the activity
or if the lender is related to a person (other than the borrower)
who has a disqualifying interest in the activity. The rule applies
even if the borrower is personally liable for the repayment of
the loan or the loan is secured by property not used in the
activity. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) provides that Section 465(b)(3)
will apply to new activities only to the extent provided in
regulations. The Tax Court in Alexander v. Commissioner, 95
T.C. 467 (1990), held that, until regulations are issued, Section
465(b)(3) could not be applied to a new activity. The IRS has
issued proposed regulations which apply Section 465(b)(3) to
the new activities described in Section 465(c)(3)(A).  As
originally enacted, I.R.C. § 465(b)(3) also applied to any
borrowing from persons related to the taxpayer under I.R.C. §
267(b). Section 432(c) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
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consumption in the year the patronage capital was retired. The
IRS argued that the allocation had to be made by using the
percentages of member/nonmember power consumption in the
year the patronage capital was earned or generated. In denying
summary judgment for the IRS, the court acknowledged that
there was no precedent for the factual or legal issues of the case
and held that expert testimony was required to determine which
method of reporting was consistent with the Internal Revenue
Code. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop. v. United States, 2003-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,560 (W.D. Mo. 2003).
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has issued temporary regulations
which exclude from the definition of passenger automobile any
truck or van that is a qualified nonpersonal use vehicle as defined
in Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(k). Qualified nonpersonal use vehicles
include not only the trucks and vans listed in Treas. Reg. §  1.274-
5T(k)(2), but also trucks and vans described in Treas. Reg. §
1.274-5T(k)(7) (relating to trucks and vans that have been
specially modified, such as by installation of permanent shelving
and painting the vehicle to display advertising or the company’s
name, so that they are not likely to be used more than a de
minimis amount for personal purposes). These specially
manufactured or modified vehicles do not provide significant
elements of personal benefit, and a taxpayer is unlikely to
purchase these vehicles unless motivated by a valid business
purpose that could not be met with a less-expensive vehicle.
The IRS also noted that future revenue procedures providing
the depreciation limits for passenger vehicles will provide higher
limits for light trucks and vans because these vehicles have a
higher price inflation rate. 68 Fed. Reg. 40129 (July 7, 2003).
The taxpayer partnership owned low-income rental housing
which was obtained with the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds. The
taxpayer had claimed depreciation deductions under the general
depreciation system of I.R.C. § 168(a) because the taxpayer did
not initially believe that depreciation could be claimed under
the alternative depreciation system of I.R.C. § 168(g). The
taxpayer claimed that the property was eligible for the alternative
depreciation system and sought consent from the IRS to change
to that system. In a Chief Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled
that the depreciation system election had to be made with the
tax return for the year the property was placed in service and
was irrevocable; therefore, the taxpayer could not change
depreciation systems. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200327041, March 27,
2003.
PARTITION.  The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned real
property as tenants-in-common with their child and a trust
established for the benefit of another child. The taxpayers owned
jointly a one-half interest in the property and a life estate as to a
one-sixth interest in the property, the child owned a one-third
interest in the property and the trust owned the remainder interest
in the taxpayers’ life estate property interest. The parties
partitioned the property so that the taxpayers owned the entire
interest in one-half of the property and a life estate in one-sixth
of the property, the child owned in fee one third of the property,
and the trust held the remainder interest in the parcel subject to
the life estate. The taxpayer held a mortgage on the property to
secure debts from the child and a third child. After the partition,
the mortgage was unchanged. The IRS ruled that the partition
would not be treated as a sale or exchange and no gain or loss
would be recognized by the transaction. Ltr. Rul. 200328034,
Oct. 1, 2002; Ltr. Rul. 200328035, Oct. 1, 2002.
PARTNERSHIPS.
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayer was
a partner in a partnership and filed for bankruptcy. The taxpayer
did not elect to end the taxpayer’s tax year on the date of the
petition but the partnership split the taxpayer’s distributive share
of partnership net operating losses between the taxpayer, for
the part of the year prior to the filing for bankruptcy, and the
bankruptcy estate, for that part of the year post-petition. The
IRS disallowed the taxpayer’s share of the partnership NOLs,
arguing that the NOLs were properly reported only by the
bankruptcy estate. The taxpayer argued that the matter had to
be handled in a partnership level proceeding. The Tax Court
held that, because the partner and bankruptcy estate were
essentially the same partner, the determination of the allocation
of the NOLs was a partner-level matter which did not need a
TEFRA administrative proceeding at the partnership level. The
Tax Court also held that the taxpayer’s share of partnership
NOLs was allocated entirely to the bankruptcy estate because
the NOLs were considered distributed at the end of the
partnership tax year which occurred after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. On appeal the appellate court held that the
issue required a TEFRA partnership level administrative
proceeding. The court noted that the filing for bankruptcy by
the partner did not convert the NOLs to nonpartnership items.
Katz v. Comm’r, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,557 (10th
Cir. 2003), rev’g in part and rem’g in part, 116 T.C. 5 (2001).
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has provided guidance on the
application of Section 620 of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107-16),
regarding elimination of user fees for certain determination letter
requests. Notice 2003-49, I.R.B. 2003-__.
For plans beginning in July 2003, the weighted average is
5.34 percent with the permissible range of 4.81 to 5.87 percent
(90 to 120 percent permissible range) and 4.81 to 6.41 percent
(90 to 110 percent permissible range) for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).
Notice 2003-48, I.R.B. 2003-32.
The IRS has issued a reminder to employers and plan
administrators that they no longer have to file information
returns, Schedule F of Form 5500, for pure fringe benefit plans.
Current Form 5500 no longer has a schedule F. IR-2003-89.
S CORPORATIONS
BANKRUPTCY.  An S corporation filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in 1996 and in 1997, a plan was confirmed and the
corporation’s assets sold. The bankruptcy trustee filed Form
1120S for the corporation’s 1997 tax year and reported gain.
The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of the corporation and
did not report the taxpayer’s share of the gain on the taxpayer’s
personal income tax return. The taxpayer argued that the filing
of the bankruptcy petition terminated the corporation; therefore,
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the taxpayer was not a shareholder in 1997. The court held that
the filing of the bankruptcy petition did not terminate the
corporation’s Subchapter S status and the taxpayer remained a
shareholder until the corporation was terminated. Mourad v.
Comm’r, 121 T.C. No. 1 (2003).
TRUSTS. The IRS has adopted as final regulations which
incorporate changes made to I.R.C. § 1361 by the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, to provide that
a testamentary trust could be a permitted shareholder of an S
corporation for a two-year period. The 1996 amendments also
provided that a former qualified subpart E trust would be a
permitted shareholder for a two-year period whether or not the
entire corpus was included in the deemed owner’s gross estate.
The regulations eliminate the special rules for determining
whether trusts consisting of community property qualify for the
two-year period. The regulations refer to electing small business
trusts (ESBTs), which were added by the 1996 Act, and provide
that certain former qualified subpart E trusts and testamentary
trusts could continue as permitted shareholders after the end of
the two-year period by becoming ESBTs. The regulations reflect
law changes (1) allowing certain exempt organizations to be S
corporation shareholders for post-1997 tax years and (2)
increasing the number of permissible S corporation shareholders
from 35 to 75. The regulations clarify that a current income
beneficiary of a testamentary trust that satisfies the QSST
requirements could make a QSST election at any time during
the two-year period in which the trust is a permitted shareholder
in the 16-day and two-month period beginning on the date after
the two-year period ends. Pursuant to this provision, a
testamentary trust would continue as a permitted shareholder
after the end of the two-year period by becoming an electing
QSST. Once the trust becomes an electing QSST, the beneficiary
would be treated as the shareholder of the S corporation as of
the effective date of the QSST election. 68 Fed. Reg. 42251
(July 17, 2003), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 2003
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21
110 percent AFR 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33
120 percent AFR 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.45
Mid-term
AFR 2.70 2.68 2.67 2.67
110 percent AFR 2.97 2.95 2.94 2.93
120 percent AFR 3.25 3.22 3.21 3.20
Long-term
AFR 4.36 4.31 4.29 4.27
110 percent AFR 4.80 4.74 4.71 4.69
120 percent AFR 5.24 5.17 5.14 5.12
Rev. Rul. 2003-94, I.R.B. 2003-__.
SPECIFIED LIABILITY LOSS. The taxpayer was a
corporation which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the
bankruptcy the taxpayer hired various professionals to assist with
the bankruptcy affairs and capitalized most of these costs. The
taxpayer sought to claim these capitalized costs as “specified
liability losses” and carry them back to previous tax years as
net operating losses. The taxpayer argued that the costs met the
conditions of I.R.C. § 172 because the costs arose under the
bankruptcy law and by order of the bankruptcy judge. The court
held that the costs were not eligible for Section 172 treatment
because the costs resulted from the taxpayer’s voluntary actions
in bankruptcy. Major Paint Co. v. United States, 2003-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,550 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
NEGLIGENCE
IRRIGATION DITCH. The defendant had a prescriptive
easement over the platiniff’s land to run an irrigation ditch and
a water right to water in a creek on the plaintiff’s land. The
defendant also had an irrigation ditch running near the
defendant’s ditch and had remodeled the ditch closer to the
defendant’s in order to increase the slope. The plainitff claimed
that the defendant ran large amounts of water through its ditch,
causing the ditch to rupture and flood the plaintiff’s land. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s remodeling of the plaintiff’s
ditch weakened the support for both ditches and caused the
defendant’s ditch to collapse near the plaintiff’s ditch. Both sides
presented expert witnesses to support their claims. The appellate
court held that the trial court’s assignment of joint liability for
the damage to both parties was supported by the evidence and
the equal weight of the expert testimony. Gravely Simmental
Ranch Co. v. Quigley, 65 P.3d 225 (Mont. 2003).
PATENTS
SAVED SEED. The plaintiff produced genetically modified
soybean seeds and sought an injunction against a soybean farmer
using the modified soybean seeds from using saved seed to
produce future crops or for sale to others. The defendant had
not signed a licensing agreement for use of the patented seed.
The plaintiff had publicized the use restrictions in trade journals,
notices to retailers and on the seed label. The plaintiff argued
that the use of saved seed violated the patent and use restrictions.
The evidence showed that the defendant had large quantities of
saved seed and was selling the seed to other producers. The
court held that the defendant was deemed to have accepted the
use restrictions by failing to object to the use restrictions within
a reasonable time; therefore, the use of the saved seed was an
infringement of the patent and justified the injunction against
use of the saved seed pending resolution of the case. The
defendant also argued that the use restriction violated Section
2543 of the Plant Variety Protection Act which allows the use
of saved seed. The court held that the PVPA was not the only
method of patenting seeds and that the utility patents obtained
by the plaintiff were not subject to the PVPA exception for saved
seeds. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs Family Farm Supply, 249 F.
Supp.2d 746 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 12-15, 2003  Holiday Inn I-25, Fort Collins, CO
September 23-26, 2003  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and understanding
from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminars are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with
separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl
will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday,
Roger McEowen will cover agricultural law developments for 2002-2003. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated
seminar materials for the days attended and lunch.
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of
Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days), $525 (three days), and $670
(four days). The registration fees for nonsubscribers are $200, $390, $570 and $720, respectively.
* * * *
October 23, 2003: “Farm & Ranch Income Tax”
by Neil E. Harl
October 24, 2003: “Farm & Ranch Estate and Business Planning”
by Roger A. McEowen
Spa Resort, Palm Springs, CA
Registrants may attend one or both days.  The registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law
Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law (and for each registrant for multiple registrations from one firm)
are $185 for one day and $360 for both days. The registration fees for nonsubscribers are $200 for one day and $390 for both days.
Registration brochures will be mailed to all subscribers. In addition, complete information and a registration form are available
now on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to
robert@agrilawpress.com
*    *    *    *
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
“Farm Income Tax and Estate and Business Planning”
by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 5-9, 2004    Waikoloa Beach Marriott Resort, Big Island of Hawaii
We are beginning to plan for another “Seminar in Paradise” in Hawaii in January 2004, if there is enough interest. The seminars run
from 8am to Noon each day. The Monday and Tuesday seminars will cover Farm Income Tax; the Wednesday and Thursday seminars
will cover Farm Estate Planning; and the Friday seminar will cover Farm Business Planning. The registration fees are $645 for current
subscribers and $695 for nonsubscribers.   Early registrants will be able to pay a non-refundable (unless we cancel) deposit of $100 in
exchange for a $50 reduction of the registration fee. If you are interested and want more information, call Robert at 541-302-1958 or e-
mail at robert@agrilawpress.com.
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